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MISSING LINKS IN THE PRESIDENT’S 
EVOLUTION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash* 
INTRODUCTION 
Pity the constitutional law professor turned President.  We expect a level 
of incoherence and confusion from Presidents who are untutored in the 
Constitution’s mysteries.  Constitutional law can be baffling with its layers 
of vague text, uncertain structure, contested history, and mystifying judicial 
doctrines.  Yet when a President has not only studied the subject but also 
taught constitutional law in a former life,1 many demand more of that 
President. 
President Barack Obama has dashed such expectations, at least when it 
comes to his evolution on same-sex marriage.  Fine-tunes and shifts in 
constitutional thought are appropriate, particularly for espousers of an 
evolving Constitution.  But the President’s public evolution has a few 
missing links, places where he shrinks from the implications of his legal 
arguments on the constitutional status of homosexuals. 
Like all evolutions, the President’s has gone through several stages.  
After entering office, he continued his predecessor’s practice of enforcing 
and defending the Defense of Marriage Act2 (DOMA), even as he sought its 
repeal.3  Enforcing the Act required his administration to read federal 
statutory references to marriage as excluding same-sex married couples.  
Defending it entailed arguing that the Act was constitutional when plaintiffs 
asserted otherwise in court. 
In early 2011, the President underwent a metamorphosis.  In his February 
letter to the Speaker of the House, Attorney General Eric Holder reported 
 
*  David Lurton Massee, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  
Thanks to John Harrison, Caleb Nelson, Steve Walt, and Erin Ward for rather helpful 
comments and discussions.  Thanks also to UVA’s Refdesk and Erin Ward for research 
assistance.  Finally, thanks to the University of Virginia for summer research support. 
 1. See Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1 (noting that Obama taught a class on equal protection and due 
process). 
 2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 3. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Smelt v. United 
States Brief (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.indianaequality.org/2009/08/17/
presidential-statement-on-doma/. 
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that the President had judged DOMA to be unconstitutional.4  First, the 
President concluded that DOMA should be subject to heightened 
(intermediate) scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment.5  Second, he determined that the statute’s failure to recognize 
same-sex marriages was indefensible under this heightened standard, 
because no important justification supported DOMA’s refusal to recognize 
such marriages.6  In fact, the Administration concluded that DOMA’s 
legislative history suggested that federal legislators sought to harm a 
politically unpopular group, an impermissible motive under equal 
protection jurisprudence.7  In sum, the Obama Administration deemed 
DOMA unconstitutional due to its impermissible and unimportant 
justification for its bar on federal recognition of same-sex marriages.8 
In May of 2012, the President had another transformation.  He now 
favored same-sex marriage, a policy he had not previously expressed either 
as a presidential candidate or as President.9  However, in reiterating his 
opposition to a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage, he insisted that the issue should be decided on a state-by-state 
basis and not be “federalized.”10  He also rejected the suggestion that he 
ought to direct the Department of Justice (DOJ) to file briefs against state 
anti-same-sex marriage laws:  “[T]his is an issue that is gonna be worked 
out at the local level, because historically, this has not been a federal issue 
. . . .”11  Further, the President explained:  “I think it is a mistake to—try to 
make what has traditionally been a state issue into a national issue.”12  He 
 
 4. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Holder Letter], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (discussing litigation involving 
the Defense of Marriage Act). 
 5. See id.  In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the 
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause had an equal protection component that applied to 
federal laws and actions. Id. at 500.  After some early decisions to the contrary, modern case 
law has made clear that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment has the 
same contours as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Adarand v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (declaring that equal protection analysis is the same in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment contexts). 
 6. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. The President may have favored gay marriage as a policy matter as a candidate for 
state office in Illinois. See Charles Krauthammer, Obama’s Same-Sex Marriage 
Contradiction, NAT’L REV. (May 17, 2012, 8:00 PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/
300338/obama-s-same-sex-marriage-contradiction-charles-krauthammer. 
 10. Transcript:  Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, ABC NEWS 
(May 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-
with-President-obama/story?id=16316043#.UEy_laPUSuk (interview transcript). 
 11. Id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Obama on Gay Marriage:  The Fine Print, 
SCOTUSBLOG (May 10, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/obama-on-
gay-marriage-the-fine-print. 
 12. Transcript:  Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, supra note 
10. 
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evidently favored local decisions about whether to recognize same-sex 
marriages. 
The President is correct that marriage historically has been the province 
of the states.13  But that fact hardly insulates state marriage laws from equal 
protection challenges, as Loving v. Virginia14 makes clear.15  And that 
makes sense, for the Fourteenth Amendment reaches all state laws, 
regardless of their subject matters.16  Specifically, modern judicial doctrine 
“federalize[s]” and makes “a national issue” of the question of same-sex 
marriage, at least insofar as it subjects all state laws to some level of equal 
protection scrutiny.17 
This fact about modern constitutional doctrine leaves the constitutional 
law professor-turned-President on the horns of a dilemma.  He cannot 
simultaneously conclude that DOMA is unconstitutional under existing 
equal protection doctrine and yet also imagine that the states may 
constitutionally refuse to permit or recognize same-sex marriage.  If federal 
laws should be subject to heightened scrutiny when they treat same-sex 
marriage differently from heterosexual marriage, then so must state laws 
that deny recognition for, or bar, same-sex marriages.  Moreover, it is 
almost certain that the heightened scrutiny the President favors would lead 
to the wholesale invalidation of those state laws.  In other words, the 
Obama Administration’s argument against DOMA, if applied to state laws, 
should generate nationwide uniformity.  Each and every state will have to 
recognize same-sex marriages, at least so long as they recognize opposite-
sex marriages. 
One suspects that President Obama’s divergent stances do not reflect a 
failure to grasp either equal protection doctrine or his argument’s 
implications for state laws.  He and his lawyers are too smart.  His 
incompatible stances more likely result from political calculation, the kind 
all Presidents engage in, even ones who formerly taught constitutional law.  
The President wants federal statutes to treat gay married couples as they 
treat heterosexual married couples.  He partly accomplishes that goal by 
failing to defend section 3 of DOMA and by explaining to the courts why 
he believes it to be unconstitutional, with the hope that the courts will agree 
and relieve him of any obligation to abide by DOMA.  But the President 
does not want to declare that he believes all state laws banning same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional, because he is unprepared to take that bolder 
stance.  That particular evolution will have to wait for a more politically 
expeditious moment.  The President’s peculiar posture allows him to make 
a constitutional argument against DOMA, express a personal preference in 
 
 13. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (declaring that 
“[i]nsofar as marriage is within temporal control, the States lay on the guiding hand”). 
 14. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 17. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1. 
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favor of same-sex marriage, and yet still permit state diversity on same-sex 
marriage.  His justifications for these incongruous stances are not as 
edifying as his constitutional law classes at the University of Chicago must 
have been. 
The President’s constitutional contortions cast doubt on the wisdom of a 
scheme where the Chief Executive may make independent constitutional 
determinations and act upon them, including declining to defend the 
constitutionality of certain federal laws.  If the President can raise 
constitutional concerns at times and then ignore them as it suits him, it 
raises misgivings about his role as a constitutional guardian.  He becomes 
less someone who can be expected to “preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution”18 and more an opportunistic pol who uses constitutional 
arguments in insincere ways to advance an electoral agenda. 
However much this critique may be true as applied to President Obama 
and same-sex marriage, one should not expect perfection from Presidents.  
Chief Executives, because they are human, always can be expected to 
advance legal arguments in an opportunistic way.  Of course, they are no 
worse than any other institution.  The Supreme Court got Marbury v. 
Madison19 and Dred Scott v. Sandford20 wrong in multiple ways.  
Moreover, federal courts occasionally issue opinions that are inconsistent 
with existing case law.21  Finally, judges are hardly above using the 
Constitution to advance their personal preferences in insincere and 
inconsistent ways.  Most do not condemn judges as legal interpreters 
merely because judges occasionally act inconsistently or insincerely.  If the 
President, as constitutional defender, is occasionally unprincipled or 
inconsistent, he has the best of company.  This is not to excuse the 
President’s same-sex marriage contortions.  It is only meant to suggest that 
when it comes to constitutional interpretation, each of us lives in a glass 
house. 
However imperfect any particular President might be, the institutional 
design question is whether the system of constitutional defense works best 
with the presidency actively defending the Constitution.  If the system is 
better with active presidential involvement, as a supplement to judicial 
review and other protective mechanisms, it does not matter much that 
presidential defense measures, by themselves, are imperfect.  In other 
words, even as we lament a President’s sacrifice of constitutional principle 
at the altar of political expediency, we may have reason to endorse a system 
where the President serves as a constitutional protector. 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 21. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 951–55 (2008) (documenting cases where the Supreme Court has 
explicitly and implicitly jettisoned precedent). 
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I.  OBAMA, DOMA, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
As noted, after entering office, the President decided that while he would 
seek the repeal of DOMA, he would continue to enforce and defend it.22  
This meant that his administration would interpret federal law references to 
marriage as including only marriages between a man and a woman.  In 
practice, this policy ensured that whatever benefits and burdens federal law 
assigned to married individuals went to opposite-sex married couples only.   
Furthermore, whenever plaintiffs argued that DOMA was unconstitutional, 
the Administration would defend its constitutionality on both equal 
protection and substantive due process grounds. 
That approach changed in February 2011, when the Attorney General and 
the President concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional because it 
discriminated against homosexuals.23  Implicit in the Attorney General’s 
letter to the Speaker of the House was the (widely-held) assumption that 
DOMA contains a sexual orientation classification.  Holder must have 
thought that because DOMA defends traditional, opposite-sex marriage by 
denying federal recognition to same-sex marriages, it classifies on the basis 
of sexual orientation.24 
Having asserted that DOMA contains a sexual orientation classification, 
the Attorney General argued that heightened scrutiny ought to apply.25  
Heightened scrutiny was appropriate, said Holder, because of the history of 
discrimination against homosexuals and their status as a discrete, politically 
 
 22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 23. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. 
 24. In fact, DOMA contains no express sexual orientation classification.  DOMA does 
not say that the federal government will not recognize marriages entered into by 
homosexuals.  Nor does it single out homosexuals and only deny them recognition of their 
same-sex marriages.  Rather, homosexuals who marry, no less than heterosexuals who do, 
are considered married under federal law, so long as they are married to someone of the 
opposite sex.  Indeed, some have argued that DOMA does not facially discriminate against 
homosexuals but instead facially discriminates on the basis of gender.  Males can only marry 
females and females can only marry males, and in this way each sex faces different legal 
constraints. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
  But even as DOMA lacks a facial sexual orientation classification, it excludes the 
very type of marriage that gays are far more likely to consummate (same-sex marriage).  So 
even though heterosexuals theoretically might choose to marry someone of the same sex in 
states that permit same-sex marriage (perhaps to obtain the beneficial treatment accorded to 
married individuals) and thus be negatively impacted by DOMA, homosexuals appear the 
targets of DOMA in purpose and effect.  Put another way, despite its lack of an explicit 
sexual orientation classification, DOMA implicitly targets homosexuals, who are far more 
likely to enter into a same-sex marriage. 
  Neither the Attorney General’s letter nor the DOJ’s filings in court acknowledge the 
more complicated relationship between DOMA and sexual orientation or what that might 
mean for its constitutionality.  Instead, both assume that DOMA contains a sexual 
orientation classification. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4; see also infra note 31. 
 25. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. 
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weak section of society.26  The application of heightened scrutiny meant 
that federal classifications based on sexual orientation must be 
“substantially related to an important government objective.”27  Moreover, 
the objective must be one that actually motivated the entity making the 
classification.28 
Applying these tests, the Attorney General concluded that the actual 
legislative justifications for DOMA were unimportant and thus failed to 
satisfy the standard.29  He claimed that the congressional debate contained 
“numerous expressions reflecting moral disapproval of gays and lesbians 
and their intimate and family relationships–precisely the kind of stereotype-
based thinking and animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard 
against.”30  In other words, Attorney General Holder believed that the 
governmental objective was moral disapproval, an unimportant objective.31  
Hence DOMA was unconstitutional, at least under heightened scrutiny. 
That was the sum and substance of the letter’s legal analysis.  Its more 
practical facet was its announcement that the Administration would not 
defend DOMA.32  Notwithstanding that decision, the Administration would 
 
 26. The Attorney General never discussed why strict scrutiny was not the correct 
standard.  Instead, he merely asserted that the more forgiving intermediate scrutiny was 
proper.  See id. 
 27. Id. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. In its briefs, the DOJ also has argued that even if DOMA’s objectives are important, 
DOMA does not substantially advance them. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief 
for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011). See generally Federal Defendants’ 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-
01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric 
H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. 
United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011). 
 32. In fact, the Administration’s legal posture was more complicated.  The President had 
determined that DOMA was unconstitutional under heightened scrutiny.  Going forward, the 
Administration would argue that such scrutiny was appropriate.  But where courts had 
already determined that DOMA was subject to rational basis review, the Administration 
would continue to defend DOMA because of its view that DOMA satisfied rational basis 
review. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.  In turn, the Administration’s actual stance 
was to defend DOMA in those circuits that previously had held that homosexual 
classifications were only subject to rational basis review.  In other circuits, the 
Administration would argue that heightened scrutiny was appropriate and attack DOMA as 
unconstitutional for failure to satisfy that scrutiny.  This stance reflected a misguided faith in 
the Duty to Defend.  Quite rightly, the Obama Administration abandoned this strange stance 
before the First Circuit in April of 2012.  The Administration said it would no longer defend 
DOMA under any standard of review. See Chris Geidner, Federal Appeals Judges Consider 
Whether DOMA Is Constitutional in Historic Hearing in Boston, METROWEEKLY (Apr. 4, 
2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/04/federal-appeals-judges-
consider-whether-doma-is.html.  The First Circuit later struck down DOMA under a rational 
basis with bite approach. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 
F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Joe Palazzolo, First Circuit Shoots Down DOMA, 
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still continue to enforce DOMA, thereby guaranteeing a live controversy to 
ensure that the courts (rather than the President) would be the final arbiters 
of its constitutionality.33  To assist the courts in this task, the executive 
branch would file briefs explaining why DOMA was unconstitutional.34  
Congress, if it chose, could appoint its own counsel to defend DOMA’s 
constitutionality.35 
In a 2012 letter to the Speaker of the House, the Attorney General 
extended his constitutional argument to other federal laws.36  Discussing the 
case filed by current and former members of the Armed Forces, 
McLaughlin v. Panetta,37 the Attorney General declared that Title 38’s 
definitional provisions,38 insofar as they affect same-sex couples, are 
unconstitutional as well.39  Those provisions, like DOMA, define “spouse” 
as a “person of the opposite sex,” thereby excluding same-sex married 
couples from the veterans’ benefits dispensed under Title 38.40  Holder 
argued that the exclusion of same-sex married couples “cannot survive 
heightened scrutiny because [the exclusions] are not ‘substantially related to 
an important governmental objective.’”41  The justifications “must describe 
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently 
grounded.”42  He quickly concluded, without elaboration, that the actual 
legislative record “contains no rationale for” excluding same-sex spouses 
from veterans’ benefits.43  Further, neither the Department of Defense nor 
the Department of Veterans Affairs could justify Title 38’s same-sex 
marriage exclusion.44 
The second Holder letter makes clear that DOMA was not uniquely 
problematic.45  Unlike DOMA, Title 38’s opposite-sex definitions of 
spouse46 were enacted in an era when there was no animus towards same-
sex marriage.  In this case, the opposite-sex definition modified a gender-
 
WSJ L. BLOG (May 31, 2012, 11:37 AM), blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/31/first-circuit-shoots-
down-doma. 
 33. 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House 
of Representatives (Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Holder Letter], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/boehner02-17-12.pdf (discussing litigation involving the Defense 
of Marriage Act). 
 37. No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011). 
 38. 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 39. See 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36. 
 40. § 101(3), (31). 
 41. 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  As with DOMA, Title 38 lacks a facial sexual orientation classification.  Again, 
anyone who marries someone of the opposite sex is considered married under Title 38, 
whether heterosexual or not.  Nonetheless, its effect is disproportionally felt by homosexuals 
who are far more likely to want to enter into a same-sex marriage. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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specific statute that assumed that only females would collect benefits as a 
result of being married to male spouses in the military.  The provision was 
meant to eliminate an assumption that men would not be married to female 
soldiers and sailors.47  Legislation cannot be motivated by animus against a 
practice if the practice is relatively unknown or, as of yet, relatively 
inconceivable.  There likely was no thought to the resulting exclusion of 
same-sex marriages because few had conceived of the possibility in 1975.48 
Yet because Holder had concluded that sexual orientation classifications 
were entitled to heightened scrutiny, no matter their provenance, what 
mattered to Holder was whether there was an important governmental 
purpose behind the supposed classification.  Of course, there could be no 
such purpose when those who enacted the relevant sections in Title 38 
likely did not fathom the possibility of same-sex marriage.  Ironically, the 
fact that Title 38’s definitional sections were enacted in an era oblivious to 
questions of same-sex marriage made those sections more susceptible to 
invalidation, at least under the Attorney General’s argument.49 
The two Holder letters are exclusively about the equal protection 
doctrine.  Neither asserted that DOMA is unconstitutional on the grounds 
that individuals have a constitutional right, via substantive due process, to 
marry someone of the same sex.  In briefs filed before courts, the 
Administration has rejected substantive due process claims against 
DOMA.50  The Administration has avoided saying whether there is a 
 
 47. S. REP. NO. 94-568, at 1, 19–20 (1975). 
 48. At least one set of plaintiffs had sought a right to marry someone of the same sex.  
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).  The case was dismissed for lack of a substantial 
federal question, a disposition that suggests that few thought the claims had any legal merit. 
Michael C. Dorf and Sidney Tarrow claim that the issue was off the radar screen through the 
1980s. See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, How the Right Helped Launch Same-Sex 
Marriage Movement, CNN OPINION (May 14, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/05/14/opinion/dorf-tarrow-same-sex-marriage/index.html. 
 49. In the February 2012 letter, the Obama Administration implicitly concluded that 
heightened scrutiny applies to suspect classifications even when legislators were almost 
certainly unaware that their law contained the classification in question.  To my knowledge, 
the Supreme Court has never confronted the question, much less held that unconscious 
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny.  The absence of relevant doctrine 
suggests the possibility that Title 38 should not be subject to heightened scrutiny.  Instead, 
one might suppose that laws classifying people via a trait that normally triggers heightened 
scrutiny should receive rational basis instead when those laws hail from an era where people 
would not have understood the underlying laws as containing any such classification.  While 
this approach has its merits, I doubt that the Obama Administration will be moved to modify 
its approach.  If one supposes that the Obama Administration seeks to break down barriers to 
the recognition of same-sex marriage, then it will disfavor any argument that suggests that 
rational basis review applies to such laws.  Moreover, the Obama Administration’s case for 
heightened scrutiny arguably rests at least in part on the desire to protect a certain class, 
regardless of the motivations or awareness of the legislature.  In other words, that legislators 
or voters were unaware that they were denying benefits to a particular group may be thought 
irrelevant. 
 50. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 
(1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
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constitutional right to marry or whether, if there is such a right, it applies to 
people who wish to marry someone of the same-sex.  Instead, it has argued 
that even if there is a substantive due process right to marry, there is no 
substantive due process right to government subsidies for the married.51 
As it stands now, the Obama Administration’s litigation strategy has the 
political virtue of pushing for the judicial nullification of DOMA without 
also declaring that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right.  It also has 
the advantage of saying nothing about the constitutionality of state laws that 
limit marriage to heterosexual couples.  At a time where there are some 
thirty states that have passed anti-same-sex marriage laws, silence on the 
issue may prove golden.52  The President, with the help of his Attorney 
General, seems to have threaded the needle. 
II.  OBAMA, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE STATES 
Yet cool politicians who thread political needles can expect to be 
criticized by the ardent.  Same-sex marriage supporters believed that the 
President went far, but not far enough.  When he came out in favor of same-
sex marriages in his May 2012 interview with ABC’s Robin Roberts,53 the 
President also ought to have declared that same-sex marriage was a civil 
right, said these gentle critics.  Because same-sex marriage is a civil right, it 
is not a matter to be left to the states, like whether to have a state income tax 
or what the state’s motto ought to be.  Critics of the President on the right, 
including some supporters of same-sex marriage, chastised his supposed 
inconsistency.54  If DOMA is unconstitutional because homosexuals have a 
right to marry, then all state laws forbidding same-sex marriage or refusing 
to recognize such marriages must be unconstitutional as well, they argued. 
Both sets of critics misread the President.  While supporters of same-sex 
marriage may believe that there is a constitutional right to such marriages, 
 
Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of 
Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-
Motion for  Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW 
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011). 
 51. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, 
Massachusetts, Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214; Federal Defendants’ Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Dragovich, No. 4:10-CV-01564; Response of Defendants United States 
of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment., Bishop, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW. 
 52. North Carolina Passes Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN Projects, CNN (May 11, 
2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/
index.html.  Thirty-one states, including North Carolina, have voted for constitutional 
amendments banning same-sex marriage. 
 53. Transcript:  Robin Roberts ABC News Interview with President Obama, supra note 
10. 
 54. See Krauthammer, supra note 9; Jacob Sullum, Obama’s Gay Marriage 
Contradiction, REASON.COM (June 13, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/06/13/
obamas-gay-marriage-contradiction. 
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the President never claimed as much.  In his May interview, he expressed a 
policy preference of the sort that has no constitutional implications.55  Just 
as a member of Congress may favor a balanced budget without believing 
that deficit spending is unconstitutional, so too may a President support 
same-sex marriage without simultaneously reading the Constitution as 
containing a right to same-sex marriage. 
For much the same reason, some critics on the right also misconstrued 
the President.  Again, the President has never said that federal law must 
recognize same-sex marriages.  Rather, the President has concluded that 
under equal protection doctrine, federal law cannot distinguish between 
same-sex and opposite-sex marriages absent some important governmental 
justification.  If federal statutes never contained marriage-based 
classifications, there obviously could be no argument against those laws on 
the grounds that they unconstitutionally distinguished some marriages from 
others.  Further, nothing in equal protection doctrine requires federal law to 
benefit marriages as opposed to other relationships, like neighbors or 
business partners. 
Having said all this, the President’s arguments that DOMA violates the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment have unmistakable 
implications for existing state laws.  First, the Holder letters declare that 
gays and lesbians are entitled to heightened scrutiny,56 a standard that 
would necessarily apply to state laws distributing benefits and burdens in a 
manner that excludes gays.  Second, the application of heightened scrutiny 
means that any state statute that draws a distinction on the basis of sexual 
orientation must be justified by an important governmental interest.57  
Third, that interest must be the one that actually motivated the relevant 
lawmakers, not a post hoc justification.  Fourth, the presence of arguments 
in the legislative history about the immorality of gay sex or same-sex 
marriage will tend to make it difficult, if not impossible, to claim that denial 
of a same-sex marriage right was motivated by an important governmental 
interest.  Finally, any law supposedly supported by an important interest 
must also substantially advance that interest.  If we apply the standards 
advanced in the 2011 and 2012 Holder letters (i.e., the five factors above) as 
Holder applied them, states that fail to permit same-sex marriage or fail to 
recognize such marriages have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
To be sure, there are differences between DOMA and the state anti-same-
sex marriage laws.  Significantly, the latter typically regulate who may get 
married, while the former says nothing about that subject.  Because states 
have long regulated who may get married and which marriages they will 
recognize, the states might be thought to have a stronger interest in barring 
 
 55. See generally Transcript:  Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President 
Obama, supra note 10. 
 56. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4; 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36. 
 57. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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same-sex marriages than the federal government does in not recognizing 
them.  Further, state laws regulating same-sex marriages may appear more 
likely to further whatever interests the states are said to be pursuing because 
states are directly regulating same-sex marriage, while the federal 
government is merely influencing such marriages indirectly, via its decision 
not to recognize such marriages.58  Still, these differences will not matter.  
More precisely, under the standards announced in the Holder letter and in 
DOJ DOMA filings, these considerations will be irrelevant. 
To see why the President’s anti-DOMA argument spells doom for state 
anti-same-sex marriages laws, we must focus on state laws.  It will prove 
helpful to divide all state laws, both statutes and constitutional amendments, 
into two categories.  The first set consists of laws enacted when same-sex 
marriage was very much in the minds of legislators and voters.  For lack of 
a better phrase, call this the “Conscious Era” because state legislators would 
have discussed (or at least been aware of) the issue of same-sex marriage as 
they tinkered with their marriage laws.  In contrast, the previous period 
reflects an obliviousness of the possibility of same-sex marriage, because 
the prospect was unknown or so obscure that state legislators would never 
have thought of the idea as they passed marriage laws.  Call this the 
“Oblivious Era.” 
When the Conscious Era began (and thus when the Oblivious Era ended) 
is uncertain.  The Conscious Era likely began after 1993, when Hawaii’s 
Supreme Court concluded that barring same-sex marriage might violate the 
state’s equal protection clause.59  It certainly began well after 1972, when 
the Supreme Court dismissed a federal appeal seeking a right to same-sex 
marriage by declaring that the case failed to present a substantial federal 
question.60  If the Supreme Court could dismiss the case so curtly, it 
suggests that the claims were far outside the era’s legal mainstream.  Those 
versed in the political history of same-sex marriage can better speculate 
 
 58. The Obama Administration believes that federal laws that refuse to recognize same-
sex marriages do not substantially advance any governmental interest because such laws do 
not directly regulate the underlying marriage relationship.  See, e.g., Combined Reply Brief 
and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal 
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross 
Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of Defendants United States of 
America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 
2011).  This logic suggests that the Obama Administration might believe that state anti-
same-sex marriage laws are more likely to directly and substantially further state interests, 
whatever they may be.  The difference is one of degree, with federal influence on marriage 
being more attenuated and the state regulation being more direct and therefore more likely 
substantial. 
 59. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). 
 60. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). 
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when the Conscious Era began.61  What is clear, however, is that the 
Oblivious Era covers most of our nation’s history. 
Many, if not all, state laws from the Conscious Era were likely motivated 
by the same concerns that propelled DOMA—a desire to endorse traditional 
marriage and discourage homosexuality.  If these concerns were 
impermissible at the federal level, as Attorney General Holder argued,62 
those interests are equally so in the states.  Indeed, in the course of using the 
lowest standard of review, the Supreme Court has said such justifications 
are inadequate for state constitutional provisions that make it more difficult 
for supporters of gay rights to enact localized protections for gays and 
lesbians.63  If one applies heightened scrutiny, it almost certainly means that 
state laws from the Conscious Era that discriminate against same-sex 
marriages are unconstitutional. 
Theoretically, it is possible for a law to be upheld even if one 
justification is impermissible, so long as one of its other justifications meets 
the applicable standard.  In its DOMA filings, the DOJ highlights the 
impermissible motivations before going on to consider whether there 
nevertheless was an important public interest motivating federal legislators.  
The secondary inquiry would have been pointless if the mere presence of 
animus necessarily invalidated otherwise acceptable motivations.64 
The theoretical possibility that acceptable motivations will overcome a 
finding of animus proves elusive in practice.  When applying a form of 
heightened scrutiny, the discovery of an improper purpose arouses the 
suspicion that it was likely the dominant, if not sole, objective and that this 
actual and forbidden motive ought to trump all else.  Justice Kennedy’s 
Romer v. Evans65 opinion illustrates this tendency, to an extreme.  Applying 
rational basis review, that opinion failed to credit Colorado’s otherwise 
legitimate purposes for instituting a ban on state or local antidiscrimination 
provisions benefiting homosexuals.66  Colorado claimed the amendment 
conserved antidiscrimination resources for other classes of persons and 
fostered freedom of association.67  Justice Kennedy said that these purposes 
could not be credited because the amendment was so broad.68  But the 
breadth of the amendment was irrelevant to the question of whether the 
interests identified were legitimate.  At most, amendment 2’s breadth was 
 
 61. See, e.g.,  Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 48. 
 62. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. 
 63. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–35 (1996). 
 64. Justice Kennedy’s Romer v. Evans opinion applies rational basis review to 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, despite first identifying animus as a possible motivation before 
considering other purposes that would have been legitimate had they been creditable. See 
517 U.S. at 632–35. 
 65. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 66. See id. at 634–35. 
 67. See id. at 635. 
 68. See id. 
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germane to whether the amendment was rationally related to the interests 
Colorado identified. 
Counterfactually, had the Court believed that the pool of Colorado voters 
was dominated by libertarians bent on fostering the freedom of association 
or by groups seeking to conserve scarce antidiscrimination resources, 
perhaps there would have been no animus found and the Court would have 
upheld the law.  But because the majority identified animus as an actual 
motivating factor, other legitimate potential bases were crowded out and 
belittled.  Because the Court essentially ignored legitimate governmental 
interests in a case subject only to rational basis review, it seems quite likely 
that the Court also would give short shrift to legitimate governmental 
interests in a case where heightened scrutiny applies.  That is to say, the 
conclusion that there is animosity lurking behind a law often will 
overwhelm and render irrelevant the presence of legitimate interests.69 
Still, it is worth considering the possible interests that might be sufficient 
to justify upholding state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages.  In the 
context of DOMA, the DOJ has not explicitly declared that defending 
traditional marriage and promoting responsible procreation and child 
rearing are impermissible or unimportant interests.  Because of this 
ambiguity, we cannot say for certain that the Administration would reject 
these interests in the context of challenges to state laws that ban, or refuse 
to recognize, same-sex marriages.70 
But the Obama Administration’s discussion of whether DOMA is 
substantially related to those interests does shed light on what its position 
ought to be on the same question vis-à-vis state laws.  The DOJ claimed 
that DOMA was not substantially related to the defense of traditional 
marriage because DOMA neither prevented same-sex marriages nor denied 
them legal protection.71 
In the case of state laws banning same-sex marriage or refusing to 
recognize that institution, they too seem unrelated to defending traditional 
marriage, albeit for different reasons.  State laws banning, or refusing to 
 
 69. While the Court has declared that a law may be upheld even when there are 
improper motivations behind it (because the law would have been enacted anyway for 
entirely appropriate reasons), see Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977), the Court apparently has yet to uphold such a law in practice. 
 70. To judge the constitutionality of state anti-same-sex marriage laws under heightened 
scrutiny, a court would have to examine the actual motivations of state legislators.  Because I 
do not wish to canvas these actual interests across dozens of laws, I use the federal interests 
at issue in DOMA on the assumption that the interests are largely the same. 
 71. See generally Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants 
at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 
10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); 
Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor 
BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-
00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011). 
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recognize, same-sex marriage do nothing to shore up traditional marriage.  
In particular, they do not make such marriages more stable or more 
meaningful, as marriage counseling or a subsidy might.  Instead, state anti-
same-sex marriage laws merely deny legal recognition to those who 
consummate such marriages.  Given the President’s position on DOMA, he 
likely will not conclude that state anti-same-sex marriage laws are 
substantially related to a defense of traditional marriage.  Rather, he likely 
would find the two largely unrelated, in the same way that the failure to 
allocate funds towards shoring up the Brooklyn Bridge would not, by itself, 
buttress the Lincoln Tunnel. 
To be sure, anti-same-sex marriage laws do have the effect of defending 
the traditional conception of marriage, but that is but a defense of a 
definition.  If anti-same-sex marriage laws merely defend the traditional 
sense of the word “marriage,” as opposed to the marriages that exist in the 
real world, that hardly seems consequential.  Indeed, one might say that 
defending the traditional denotation of a word or phrase is never important.  
In any event, the Obama Administration almost certainly does not believe 
that defending the traditional sense of an institution is a substantial interest. 
So the Obama Administration might concede that defending actual 
marriage of the traditional sort is an important interest.  But it is quite likely 
to insist that state anti-same-sex marriage laws do not substantially advance 
that interest but instead deny equal protection to those who seek state 
recognition of their same-sex marriages. 
Anti-same-sex marriage laws do not substantially advance responsible 
procreation and childrearing justifications either.  No state limits 
procreation to heterosexuals, much less married heterosexuals.  
Homosexuals may continue to procreate, via sperm or egg donations, 
whether or not states ban same-sex marriages.  Anti-same-sex marriage 
laws only affect decisions to procreate at the margin, when a homosexual 
decides not to procreate because he or she cannot marry another 
homosexual.  This means that anti-same-sex marriage laws do not 
substantially advance responsible procreation. 
Similarly, homosexuals can continue to rear children, whether or not the 
states recognize same-sex marriages.  Homosexual childrearing is unlikely 
to decrease in any substantial way merely because states refuse to recognize 
or permit same-sex marriage.  Moreover, with respect to childrearing, the 
DOJ has rejected the notion that gays and lesbians cannot be, or are less 
likely to be, responsible parents.72  Again, while responsible childrearing 
may be an important governmental interest, the Obama Administration will 
deny that anti-same-sex marriage laws substantially advance that interest. 
 
 72. See Superseding Brief for the United States Department of Health & Human 
Services, et al. at 49–51, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2204 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 
2011). 
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In sum, the state laws passed during the Conscious Era are likely to have 
the same flaws that the DOJ has identified in DOMA.  First, they are 
presumably motivated, at least in part, by moral disapproval or a bare desire 
to harm an unpopular group, neither of which constitute “important 
governmental interests.”  Second, alternative justifications will likely either 
fail that standard or be insufficiently related to the state law, and thus not 
“substantially related” to the important governmental purpose. 
Of course, not all state laws that plaintiffs will challenge are from the 
Conscious Era.  Some were passed during the Oblivious Era.  As noted, this 
second category of state laws reflects ignorance of the possibility of same-
sex marriage (rather than disapproval of it) because these laws were passed 
before people had conceived of that possibility.  During this period, it 
would not have occurred to legislators that limiting marriage to opposite sex 
couples might constrain anyone, except those who wished to have a plural 
marriage.  More precisely, most state legislators would not have been aware 
that there were people (constituents, friends, or relatives) who wished to 
marry someone of the same sex.  Steeped in conventional sexual mores, the 
idea of same-sex marriage did not exist in the minds of those legislators.73  
The Oblivious Era covers much of the nation’s history and has an uncertain 
terminus because it is hard to identify precisely when an issue becomes 
sufficiently salient that legislators would have considered the matter in their 
deliberations. 
While marriage laws from the Oblivious Era cannot reflect animus 
towards gays and lesbians because no one would have thought of same-sex 
marriage when they were adopted, the absence of animus does not 
automatically insulate them from attack.  If one believes, as the Obama 
Administration does, that all laws employing a sexual orientation 
classification are subject to heightened scrutiny, then laws from the 
Oblivious Era likewise should be subject to that standard, even if legislators 
were unaware of the possibility of same-sex marriage.  As noted earlier, the 
Obama Administration seems to have concluded that all laws classifying by 
sexual orientation must be subject to heightened scrutiny, even if no 
legislator at the time recognized that the proposed law contained a sexual 
orientation classification.74  Under the Obama Administration’s argument, a 
law from the 1960s or even the 1860s that explicitly or implicitly limits 
 
 73. It may be hard for some to believe that there was a time when people were unaware 
of gay marriage.  To better grasp the obliviousness of such an era, consider a law that 
explicitly bans plural marriages, passed in an era where legislatures were focused solely on 
polygyny and wholly unaware of the possibility of polyandry.  Such a law obviously would 
have effects on polyandrous marriages as people sought to enter into such marriages.  Yet no 
one would say that the ban on plural marriages reflected an animus towards polyandrous 
marriages.  We may well live in such an era, for when people think of plural marriages, the 
image that arises is a single man marrying multiple women. In fact, there are polyandrous 
societies, most notably Keralite society, in South India.  The further idea that multiple 
women might marry multiple men (polyamory) is, for many, wholly unfathomable, 
something found only in the pages of science fiction. 
 74. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing 2012 Holder Letter). 
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marriage to a man and a woman contains a sexual orientation distinction, 
regardless of whether the actual legislators consciously intended as much. 
As we saw in the federal context, applying the heightened, intermediate 
scrutiny standard to laws from the Oblivious Era leads to an interesting 
result.  Such laws are obviously unconstitutional because they lack an 
important justification for their discrimination against same-sex marriages.  
After all, legislators or voters cannot have an important justification for a 
legal classification that they were wholly unaware of when enacting the 
underlying law.  In other words, if one does not know that one has excluded 
a class of people from some government recognition or benefit, one can 
hardly have an important justification for the exclusion.  Again, somewhat 
ironically, ignorance of the possibility of same-sex marriage leads to the 
invalidation of state laws that were passed in an era before same-sex 
marriage leapt into the national consciousness, at least if heightened 
scrutiny applies as the Obama Administration contends. 
The Administration’s conclusion that Title 38 contains a sexual 
orientation classification is suggestive of its general approach to federal 
laws from the Oblivious Era.  Congress passed the relevant provisions in 
Title 38 in 1975 as a means of making the veterans’ laws gender-neutral.75  
Paying no heed to this context, Attorney General Holder declared that “[t]he 
legislative record of these provisions contains no rationale for providing 
veterans’ benefits to opposite-sex spouses of veterans but not to same-sex 
spouses of veterans.”76 
Given its treatment of Title 38, the Administration presumably would 
apply heightened scrutiny to all federal laws that draw distinctions based on 
sexual orientation, regardless of the eras in which they were enacted.  And 
if it applied such scrutiny to all such federal laws, it also must believe that 
such scrutiny properly applies to state laws that hail from the Oblivious Era.  
Like Title 38, all such laws would be unconstitutional because “the 
legislative record[s]” of all these laws would contain “no rationale” for not 
recognizing same-sex marriages.77 
In sum, the Obama Administration has to believe that heightened scrutiny 
applies to all state laws that draw classifications based on sexual 
orientation, whatever their vintage.  Moreover, it must regard both state and 
federal laws, whenever enacted, either as lacking important interests or as 
insufficiently related to any important interests that might exist.  Taken 
together, these arguments suggest that it is inconceivable that DOMA 
would be unconstitutional because it lacked an important justification or 
was poorly tailored to advance those important interests, but that similar 
state laws are somehow constitutional.  While state anti-same-sex marriage 
laws certainly differ from DOMA, those differences are constitutionally 
 
 75. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
 76. 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36, at 2. 
 77. See id. 
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irrelevant.  More precisely, using the logic of the Obama Administration’s 
legal arguments, those differences are immaterial. 
This takes us back to the President’s stated desire to leave the issue of 
same-sex marriage to the states and his rejection of attempts to federalize it.  
Having publicly concluded that sexual orientation classifications are subject 
to heightened scrutiny and that DOMA fails to satisfy that standard, the 
President cannot simultaneously conclude that states may bar or refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages.  If DOMA is unconstitutional because it 
violates equal protection, the same must be said of state anti-same-sex 
marriage laws.  The President’s arguments against DOMA federalize the 
same-sex marriage question.  He has hoisted himself on his own equal 
protection petard. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTOR IN THE DOCK 
What does this inconsistency say about the Presidency’s capacity as a 
constitutional guardian?  The Chief Executive must “preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution.”78  At a minimum, this duty forbids him from 
violating the Constitution.  Elsewhere, I have argued that this duty to avoid 
violations bars the President from implementing the unconstitutional 
schemes of others, even when they take the form of laws.79  If the President 
believes a law is unconstitutional, he should not enforce it, much less 
defend its constitutionality.  Instead, a President faced with a statute that he 
believes to be unconstitutional must treat it as void and ignore it.  In other 
words, he has a duty to disregard unconstitutional federal laws, lest he serve 
as an instrument of the Constitution’s violation.  In this respect, Presidents 
should emulate Thomas Jefferson, who refused to enforce the Sedition Act 
because he thought it unconstitutional.80  As Jefferson put it, he had no 
more obligation to enforce it than he did a law requiring prostration before a 
golden image.81  Going further, he argued that the Constitution forbade him 
from enforcing a law that he believed was unconstitutional.82 
How is the President to decide whether a federal law is unconstitutional, 
and must he accept judicial opinions as the final word on such matters?  
Because the Constitution never demands that he obey anyone else’s 
interpretation of it, the President need not adopt judicial understandings, 
tests, and formulas.83  Instead, the President may decide for himself what 
the Constitution demands or permits, just as the courts may decide for 
themselves.  That is to say, he should act on his own constitutional 
 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. 
 79. See generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008). 
 80. See id. at 1664–69. 
 81. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 1 THE 
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 274, 275 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
 82. Id. at 276. 
 83. See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 
84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998). 
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conclusions as he goes about preserving and protecting the Constitution, 
including disregarding statutes he believes are unconstitutional. 
President Obama’s stance towards DOMA fails this standard and instead 
reflects the muddled, unsatisfactory nature of modern executive practice.  
The President has split the difference in a way that ensures that the courts 
will ultimately decide the constitutionality of DOMA.  He no longer 
defends the law’s constitutionality and in fact attacks it on that score.  As 
Neal Devins and I have argued, the decision to attack DOMA is not only 
sensible, it is constitutionally required.84  The Constitution does not permit 
the President to defend laws he regards as unconstitutional, for such 
defenses are inconsistent with his duty to defend the Constitution.  
Moreover, his duty to defend the Constitution obliges him to speak out 
against those laws he believes are unconstitutional. 
But the President’s decision to continue to enforce DOMA85 is a mistake 
born of institutional incentives and a misunderstanding of the Supreme 
Court’s role in the Constitution’s defense.86  To focus on the second point, 
the Administration believes that the Supreme Court plays a special, 
privileged role in constitutional defense, so special that the Administration 
embraces the risk that the Supreme Court might rule DOMA 
constitutional.87  The Constitution never says as much; it instead singles out 
the President as a constitutional defender.88  In any event, given the 
President’s stated policy of enforcing DOMA, he obviously will continue to 
enforce it should the Court eventually uphold it.  Again, this is not 
defending the Constitution as much as participating in and furthering a 
continuing assault upon it. 
The President’s ill-advised DOMA enforcement policy is compounded 
by his mistaken constitutional apathy towards state anti-same-sex marriage 
laws.  The President’s oath does not merely require that he not perpetrate or 
participate in constitutional wrongs.  It goes further, obliging him to defend 
it against the attacks of others—the duty is to preserve, protect, and defend, 
without any limitation on the class of assailants, foreign or domestic.89 
One set of potential constitutional aggressors sits in the chambers of state 
legislatures.  No less than White House staff, and members of Congress, 
state legislators may breach the Constitution.  For instance, they may pass 
ex post facto laws or enact measures inconsistent with republican 
government.  Or they may deny due process of law, in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 84. See generally Saikrishna Prakash & Neal Devins, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012). 
 85. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4 (discussing the role of the Supreme Court). 
 86. See generally Prakash & Devins, supra note 84. 
 87. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4 (declaring the judiciary the “final arbiter” of 
constitutional claims). 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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In the case of state laws, presidential disregard will accomplish nothing 
because state executives enforce such laws.  If the President is to satisfy his 
oath with respect to state legal infringements, more than passivity is 
necessary.  When confronted with aggressions against the Constitution from 
state legislators in the form of state laws, the President, at a minimum, 
should denounce those laws as unconstitutional.90  He or his administration 
ought to speak out against state laws that deny due process or abridge the 
obligations of contracts. 
At least, he ought to do this when he is aware of such violations and has 
time to speak out in the midst of his numerous other responsibilities.  
Although the Constitution requires the President to serve as its protector, it 
imposes other high obligations on him.  He must faithfully execute those 
federal laws that are constitutional, meaning that he cannot simply focus on 
whether a law is constitutional.  He also must faithfully execute the office 
of the President and hence must steward foreign relations, superintend the 
military, defend the nation, decide which laws to veto on policy grounds, 
and propose new laws.  Because the President has so many duties and 
functions, he cannot obsess, in the manner of a constitutional law professor, 
on the Constitution.91  The existence of many other duties and the need to 
allocate limited resources means that the President (and his administration) 
will be unable to mount a perfect defense of the Constitution. 
Because Presidents are quite busy, fulfilling a number of duties and 
exercising a number of discretionary powers, a President’s failure to 
comment on the constitutionality of state laws will ordinarily be quite 
excusable.  Yet I believe that President Obama has no excuse for his 
silence.  A President who has already done the heavy constitutional lifting 
and concluded that federal laws discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation are unconstitutional has a constitutional duty to say something 
about state laws that draw the same distinctions.  His DOJ already has 
penned briefs detailing why it believes heightened scrutiny is appropriate 
and why DOMA is unconstitutional under such scrutiny.  Each of these 
briefs follows the same outline:  argue at great length that sexual orientation 
is a suspect class and then contend that the DOMA fails heightened 
scrutiny.92  Reproducing these briefs with a few minor modifications and 
filing them in federal and state courts hearing challenges to state anti-same-
 
 90. In at least one instance, President Obama has actually filed suit against state laws 
that he believes are unconstitutional. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 91. See Prakash, supra note 79, at 1676. 
 92. See, e.g., Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 
9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-
2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); 
Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor 
BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-
00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011).   
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sex marriage laws hardly entails much new work.  The most difficult part 
might be addressing whether the relevant state laws enjoy important 
justifications.  But having decided previously that certain justifications are 
unimportant, that analysis should not be too arduous. 
At a minimum, the Administration should declare that state-based sexual 
orientation classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny, perhaps saying 
nothing about how that test should apply to particular state laws.  This 
would involve, at most, a few hours work for Justice Department lawyers 
because they have already made all these arguments.  As noted earlier, 
when it comes to equal protection, judicial doctrine generally makes no 
distinctions between federal and state laws.93  Indeed, the cases cited in 
government DOMA briefs about heightened scrutiny are typically federal 
cases applying the equal protection standard to state laws, most prominently 
United States v. Virginia.94 
The failure to file any such brief in the myriad challenges to state laws 
that prohibit same-sex marriage or that discriminate against such marriages 
could reflect a “go-slow” legal strategy designed to vindicate the 
constitutional right in increments.  The fear is that the courts might not see 
eye-to-eye with a broader reading of equal protection that the executive 
branch might sketch.  In other words, a go-slow approach might be 
defensible if the President believed that the strategy would lead the courts 
to ultimately agree with him that state anti-same-sex marriage laws are 
subject to heightened scrutiny and therefore unconstitutional.  Consider this 
a somewhat counterintuitive but plausible argument for passivity in 
executive branch constitutional defense.95 
But in the context of the world as it exists today, there is no sound case 
for executive passivity.  Courts currently are judging the constitutionality of 
state laws that discriminate against same-sex marriages.  They will decide 
these cases, with or without the benefit of the executive branch’s 
constitutional wisdom.  In this context, the go-slow strategy makes no sense 
because the horse is already out of the barn, so to speak.  The executive 
must weigh in, lest the courts reject its sense of the Constitution.  At least, it 
must do so if it supposes that arguments matter and that its good arguments 
may sway the courts. 
Given that courts will decide the matter whether or not the executive is 
passive, the executive branch’s silence in challenges to state anti-same-sex 
marriage laws likely has little to do with any sort of legal strategy.  Instead, 
it almost certainly reflects a political calculation.  In an election year, the 
President likely does not want to declare that all state laws barring same-sex 
marriage or discriminating against such marriages are unconstitutional 
 
 93. See supra note 5. 
 94. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 95. For a discussion of passivity in the context of the judicial branch, see generally 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword:  The Passive Virtues, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
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infringements of the Equal Protection Clause.  It also seems quite likely that 
the President, for political reasons, wishes to avoid taking the more limited 
step of declaring that heightened scrutiny applies to state laws that contain 
sexual orientation classifications.  Doing so would come too close to saying 
that such laws are unconstitutional. 
If election year politics explains why the Obama Administration has 
refused to declare whether state laws constraining or forbidding same-sex 
marriage are unconstitutional, then we have a case of the President acting 
sincerely in one context and insincerely in another.  Such behavior gives 
credence to those who would deny the President any right to act upon his 
constitutional beliefs out of a fear that the executive would come to 
dominate constitutional interpretation and execute this undertaking 
unfaithfully.  In other words, some might fret that in a world where the 
President is a significant constitutional interpreter, constitutional law will 
become unprincipled. 
This concern has some merit.  If Presidents raise constitutional arguments 
only when it suits their political agenda and ignore such concerns when 
doing so would be politically inexpedient, perhaps Presidents ought to be 
denied a role in constitutional defense.  Maybe Presidents should do no 
more than is typically done now (i.e., veto and pardon based on their own 
constitutional readings).  Going further, maybe they ought to be barred from 
even playing that limited constitutional role. 
Yet even as this concern has merit, it is also rather overblown.  To begin 
with, the concern about presidential suitability in constitutional 
interpretation must necessarily be a comparative one.  That is to say, we 
must not only compare the courts with the President and consider which is a 
better constitutional defender; we also must ask whether the system as a 
whole is superior if both defend the Constitution simultaneously, in their 
own ways.  Thus framed, the presidency’s vigorous participation in 
constitutional interpretation and defense fares better. 
To begin with, all federal institutions look bad when considered in 
isolation, because it is easy to recall episodes where each has fared poorly.  
Consider the heroes of the modern era:  the courts.  Judges are not above 
acting on the basis of political reasons; they have done so many times, with 
cases like Marbury and Dred Scott serving as notorious examples.  Other 
times, judicial decisions are not so much political as they are driven by 
considerations of sound policy, on the theory that the Constitution permits 
invocation of policy concerns in constitutional interpretation.  Given that 
judges are not immune from the temptation to leaven judicial interpretation 
with policy preferences, politics, and personal morality, it would be wrong 
to harshly judge Presidents who might trim here and there when applying 
their constitutional views.  In any event, we must recognize that 
inconsistency and partiality are inevitable features of human institutions and 
hence there will never be a perfect constitutional defender. 
Moreover, we have reason to suspect that Presidents who only dabble in 
constitutional interpretation and defense are less likely to fully embrace 
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those roles and fulfill them faithfully.  Perhaps if Presidents more routinely 
declined to enforce laws that they believed were unconstitutional, they also 
would consider what their arguments meant for identical or similar state 
laws and then say something about those laws.  In other words, a more 
thorough internalization of the constitutional protector model may 
eventually generate more consistency and coherence on the part of 
Presidents and their administrations. 
Finally, we should be wary of assuming that what President Obama has 
done here reflects what Presidents have done more generally.  We have 
very few samples of presidential defenses of the Constitution, most of 
which have not been studied that well.  For a better sense of how Presidents 
would fare under a more robust system of constitutional defense, we need 
far more episodes of presidential intervention and more attention lavished 
upon them.  We also need to know more about the President’s sense of the 
Constitution and whether that sense is being applied consistently across 
state and federal law.  Whether those episodes come, whether the 
President’s constitutional vision becomes more readily accessible or 
perceptible, or whether the presidency remains a relatively passive 
constitutional defender is unknown.  Stay tuned to see if we get more 
aggressive defenses of the President’s reading of the Constitution.  Only 
then will we have a more informed sense of whether the presidency is a 
systematically insincere or opportunistic defender of the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
 Incrementalism and federalism are good things.  But both must give way 
when constitutional rights are at stake.  If DOMA is subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, then that same analysis necessarily applies to state laws that also 
contain sexual orientation classifications.  Moreover, if morality and 
defending traditional marriage are unimportant governmental interests in 
the context of DOMA, the same conclusions must be true when such 
interests are cited in defenses of state anti-same-sex marriage laws.  Finally, 
if one believes that DOMA’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages does 
not substantially advance any important interest, one almost certainly has to 
believe that state laws that bar same-sex marriages likewise do little to 
advance important interests. 
In her interview with the President, Robin Roberts seemed to sense as 
much.  Perhaps that is one reason why she pressed the President on the 
question of states and same-sex marriage.  The President evaded the 
seeming inconsistency, as all smart interviewees do.  But his dodging will 
not last forever.  There will be a time when the missing links in the 
President’s evolution will be found.  At some point, almost certainly after 
the 2012 presidential election, Barack Obama will declare that he believes 
states must recognize and permit same-sex marriages, at least as long as 
they recognize and permit opposite-sex marriages.  If he declares as much 
as President, the former constitutional law professor will then order the 
DOJ to file briefs laying out the argument—briefs that will look rather 
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similar to the ones DOJ lawyers are filing today in DOMA cases.  If he 
loses the election, our retired President will speak out against what he 
perceives to be a constitutional violation.  Either way, evolution is coming, 
as it always does. 
